This paper researches the determinants of financing decisions of extreme growth companies. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal dataset, free of survivorship bias, covering the financing events of extreme growth companies for up to eight years. Results are generally consistent with the extended pecking order theory. Profitable companies are more likely to use internal finance, while they have unused debt capacity, which is contrary to the predictions of the static trade-off theory. External equity is used as a last resort. Nearly 20% of the firms issuing external equity have a negative shareholders' equity in the previous year. Finally, consistent with the static tradeoff theory, companies with a higher probability and costs of financial distress and higher agency costs are more likely to issue external equity financing.
INTRODUCTION
Although few in number, rapidly growing ventures contribute disproportionately to employment and wealth creation in any economy. This makes organizational growth a major policy concern and a central area of research in entrepreneurship. The purpose of this paper is to offer an insight into the financing decisions of extreme growth companies. Sufficient and adequate financing are a crucial resource, especially for high growth ventures, and proper financial management is one of the key factors shaping high growth ventures (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005) . Nevertheless, our understanding of how high growth ventures are financed over time remains limited.
Studying the financing decisions in a high growth environment is important for a number of reasons. First, most high growth companies have to attract large amounts of financing in order to support their growth. Internal finance is generally insufficient to finance extreme growth (Michaelas et al., 1999) . Consequently, we will be able to study financing decisions in a setting where companies will have to move further in the pecking order. It is less likely that financing decisions of high growth companies will be truncated to using internal financing. Second, by studying extreme growth companies both policymakers, researchers and entrepreneurs can obtain a better understanding of the characteristics and processes related with extreme growth (Barringer et al., 2005) . The impact of company characteristics may vary according to the research setting (Harris and Raviv, 1991) . Therefore, it is important to test financial theories, particularly in settings where our knowledge is limited, to determine the generalizability of these theories across different companies (Cassar, 2004) .
By investigating the financing decisions of extreme growth companies this research addresses a number of drawbacks of previous research. First, we focus on incremental financing decisions, not on the capital structure, which is the aggregate of all previous financing decisions. Traditional capital structure research does not make a distinction between internal financing and external equity financing. However, this distinction may be particularly important. Company characteristics are expected to have a different impact on a firm's decision to use internal financing or attract external equity, specially in a setting characterized by high informational asymmetries (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003) , such as a high growth setting. Second, the lack of longitudinal studies in entrepreneurship research has been described as a major impediment (Davidsson and Wiklund, 1999) . Our study analyses the incremental financing decisions of ventures over a period of up to 8 years, during which all ventures in our sample experienced extreme growth. Furthermore, we include start-ups as well as failed or merged companies, if they have grown considerably before disappearing. This implies that our study does not suffer from survivorship bias.
The paper begins with a discussion of the theoretical background and development of hypotheses. Next, we discuss the data set, where we describe in detail how extreme growth companies are identified, how financing events are identified and how independent variables are measured. Then, we present our main research findings. Finally, we offer a conclusion and avenues for further research.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESES
The debt-equity financing choice is generally described in either a static trade-off or a pecking order framework. The static trade-off theory states companies will trade-off the benefits of debt, especially agency benefits and tax benefits of interest payments, against the cost of debt financing, namely bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt (Jensen, 1986; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Modigliani and Miller, 1963) . The static trade-off theory indicates a company will make incremental financing decisions in such a way that an optimal capital structure is obtained. A different perspective is the pecking order theory (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . In the pecking order theory, information asymmetries between the company and investors stand central. As external investors have less information on the investment projects for which entrepreneurs search financing, they may undervalue financial assets, more specifically equity. This causes companies to prefer internal financing over external financing sources and prefer debt over external equity to fund new investment projects.
A high growth setting may be a fruitful setting to research financing decisions. As previous descriptive literature indicates the financing decisions of entrepreneurs may be truncated by demand side considerations such as the willingness to remain independent and keep control over the venture (Howorth, 2001) . These demand side considerations may constrain companies from growing further (Manigart and Struyf, 1999) . This problem will be less pronounced in our sample of companies, which eventually realize extreme growth. Growing a business generally requires substantial resources, such as financial capital. Therefore, it is expected that high growth companies will have to move further in the pecking order and consider the use of external financing. The pecking order theory predicts that if internal financing sources are insufficient to cover a firm's financing needs, the firm will issue debt financing, which is the next least risky financial asset. Companies will use external equity financing only as a last resort (Myers and Majluf, 1984) . This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Extreme growth companies which have less internal funds are more likely to attract outside financing.
Significant external equity issues by small, high growth ventures are considered to refute the pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002) . However, taking into account debt capacity, the previous finding is not inconsistent with the pecking order theory (Lemmon and Zender, 2004) . Excessive use of debt financing may imply that the costs of financial distress curtail further debt issues. Financial intermediaries may ration credit to these highly levered companies and companies will therefore issue external equity as a last resort. Empirical evidence indicates that particularly small and high growth ventures may face the more restrictive debt capacity constraints (Lemmon and Zender, 2004) . This because, most extreme growth companies require extraordinary resources to support growth and internal finance is generally insufficient. Therefore, these companies are more likely to reach their debt capacity more quickly. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Extreme growth companies with lower debt capacity are more likely to attract additional external equity financing instead of financial debt.
Extreme growth does not necessarily equal financial success. Growth that is too rapid may threaten company survival (Smith and Smith, 2000) . Argenti (1976) identifies decisions that overextended the organization's assets as an important cause of company failure. Entrepreneurs of extreme growth ventures have to overcome important challenges. High growth companies often fail to adapt to the new requirements imposed by high growth. Potential problems include: gaps in the skills and systems required to manage extreme growth, unwillingness to change strategies and behaviour by incumbents even if competitive forces have changed and the need for extraordinary resources to support growth (Nicholls-Nixon, 2005) . When the probability that a venture goes bankrupt is high, a company will find it difficult to attract additional debt financing. Banks only earn a fixed interest margin on the financing offered to a company. In contrast to equity investors, debt holders do not share in the firm's upward potential and are therefore particularly interested in the downside risk. Therefore, additional bank financing may be difficult to obtain for companies with a high probability of failure.
Asset structure can play an important role in financial decision making, as the cost of liquidation depends on the nature of a firm's assets. In the case of financial distress, more tangible, non-specific assets will have a higher liquidation value compared to growth options, intangible assets and company specific assets (Titman and Wessel, 1988) . Additionally, firms can address information asymmetry and agency problems by providing collateral as a security of bank loans (Cassar, 2004; Michaelas et al., 1999) .
Hypothesis 3: Extreme growth companies with higher cost and probability of financial distress will be less likely to attract additional debt financing.
When a company decides to attract additional debt financing, conflicts of interest may arise between debt holders and equity holders. The principal concern of the debt holders is to receive the principal amount at maturity with intermediate interest payment, while shareholders want to maximize the value of their shares. Once debt holders have offered financing, shareholders may, for example, have an incentive to take higher risks at the detriment of debt holders. These agency problems may be particularly important in a high growth setting, for companies that invest in assets which offer the venture future growth options (Myers, 1977) . Taking into account these agency problems, debt holders may require higher interest rates ex-ante. Moreover, debt holders may insist on including various covenants and protective devices in the loan agreement, which further increases the cost of debt financing. This leads to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Extreme growth companies with higher agency risks are more likely to attract additional external equity financing.
THE DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
The empirical evidence of this paper is based on a database containing detailed yearly financial statement data of all Belgian companies from 1994 until 2004. All Belgian companies (with limited liability of the shareholders), irrespective of their size, have to file detailed financial statement data with the National Bank of Belgium. For each year between 1997 and 2004 we select all firms that are (a) active in Flanders and Brussels (the two most developed regions in Belgium) and (b) employ at least 10 people. This results in a data set of 32,754 companies.
Both independent companies and companies which belong to a company group structure are included. Additionally, both companies starting up within the time frame of this study and firms disappearing from the database, because they failed or were taken over, are included. Therefore, there is no survivorship bias in our study, which is an important advantage compared to the majority of other entrepreneurial finance studies. The units of analysis in this study are the financing events of extreme growth ventures.
In what follows, we first discuss how extreme growth companies are identified. Second, we develop the measures of financing events. Finally, we discuss the independent variables.
Identifying extreme growth companies
Previous organizational growth research is criticized as it does not take into account the multidimensional nature of growth. The classification of a company as a high growth company is very much dependent on the growth concept and growth formula used (Delmar et al., 2003) . We explicitly take into account the multidimensional nature of growth. First, we use different growth concepts, such as sales, employees, total assets, cash flow and added value. The use of different concepts gives richer information and may therefore be better than using a single indicator (Weinzimmer et al., 1998) . Second, we use both absolute and relative growth measures following Davidsson and Wiklund (1999) . While absolute growth measures tend to favor larger companies, relative growth measures tend to favor smaller companies. Although compound measures have been developed to tackle this problem (e.g. Birch-index), these measures lack a conceptual basis (Davidsson and Wiklund, 1999) .
Growth in each year is measured as a moving average of the growth rate in the previous three years. In order to be selected as an extreme growth company, a company has to be twice among the first percentile of all firms on a particular growth concept (sales, employees, total assets, cash flow or added value) using a particular growth formula (absolute versus relative). In practice, this means that a company has to be twice among the top 200 companies in Flanders and Brussels in one of 10 growth dimensions (two growth formulas * five growth concepts). 2,077 Companies were selected in this way. The yearly absolute growth in added value is at least €5,256,179 for added value growers, €4,067,419 for cash flow growers, €52,269,000 for total asset growers, €21,619,000 for revenue growers and 46 employees for employment growers. The cut off yearly relative growth rate lies between 317% (for revenue growers) and 2406% (for added value growers). These descriptive statistics clearly indicate that only top growth companies are considered. Table 1 shows the sector distribution of the extreme growth. Extreme growth companies are especially prevalent in the transportation and communication sector (31.49%), the building and civil engineering industry (23.83%) and in the distributive trades, hotels, catering and repairs sector (13.34%). It is noteworthy that around 80% of the extreme growth companies are active in low tech industries.
Dependent variable: financing events
In this study, we focus on the incremental financing decisions of extreme growth companies. This approach has several advantages compared to static capital structure research. First, the capital structure of a company is the aggregate of all previous financing events of a company. It is a snapshot of a company's complete financing history (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003) . Therefore, information on the timing of acquiring finance is ignored. Second, typical debt ratios do not distinguish between internal finance and external equity finance (de Haan and Hinloopen, 2003) . Nevertheless, a distinction between these two different types of financing is important.
The dependent incremental financing event variables are constructed following Hovakimian et al. (2001) and de Haan and Hinloopen (2003) . Firms are coded as using internal finance when the amount of retained earnings within a particular year exceed 5% of total assets. A threshold value of 5% is used to assure that the focus of the analyses is on relatively substantial financing events. Firms are coded as using short term or long term financial debt if there is a net increase of outstanding financial debt with a maturity of respectively less than one year and more than one year which exceeds 5% of total assets. Similarly, firms are coded as using external equity financing when there is a net increase in external equity of at least 5% of total assets.
The descriptive statistics of the dependent discrete financing events are reported in Table 2 . Each year, more than half of the extreme growth ventures use internal finance or rely on external financing. Over the entire time frame of our study, 92% of the ventures have at least one financing event and the median number of financing events equals 4. This suggests that being able to attract sufficient financial resources may be of paramount importance to support extreme growth.
Second, it is often assumed that rapidly growing ventures will have insufficient cash flows to finance their growth internally (Michaelas et al., 1999) . Table 2 shows that financial debt is indeed the most common financing route, accounting for some 45% of the financing events (25% of the financing events relate to short term debt and 20% to long term debt). Internal finance is the second most used way to finance growth: some 39% of the financing needs are addressed internally. Finally, only 16% of the financing events relate to raising external equity financing. Table 2 further provides the average size of the financing events (excluding the cases without a financing event). The median size of internal financing events equals 15% of total assets. The median long term debt issue is larger than the median short term debt issue with respectively 16% and 13% of total assets. The largest median issue size is for external equity issues with 21% of total assets.
Independent variables
All independent variables are lagged one year in order to avoid problems of causality. This problem would be especially important for earnings and the retention ratio. This last measure stands at the basis of our calculation of internal financing events. However, when earnings are lagged one year, the correlation between lagged earnings and retention ratio equals only 0.0015. Where appropriate, independent variables are scaled by total assets in order to standardize the variables and make them comparable for ventures with a different size. Table 3 gives the variable definition of the proxies for preference for internal finance, debt capacity, financial distress and agency costs. Moreover, table 3 reports the correlations for the continuous independent and control variables. Table 4 shows the characteristics of firms relying on internal finance, debt financing and external equity financing. The mean earnings to total assets ratio is significantly lower for companies issuing outside debt or equity financing compared to companies issuing internal financing. Companies using internal finance have a higher mean ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets compared to debt issuers. However, the difference in cash and cash holding is not statistically different when comparing companies using internal finance and external equity financing. Furthermore, pecking order considerations are likely to influence dividend policy. Paying dividends is less attractive for companies with few profitable assets in place and high leverage (Fama and French, 2002) . The payout ratio is significantly lower for companies issuing external financing compared to companies using internal financing. These findings are generally consistent with hypothesis 1.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS

Bivariate analyses
Companies using retained earnings to finance investment projects have significantly higher internal cash flow to total asset ratios and lower debt ratios compared to companies issuing external financing. Therefore, although companies using internal finance have higher debt capacity, they prefer not to use this capacity. Consistent with Lemmon and Zender (2004) we find that extreme growth companies prefer to preserve debt capacity when possible, contrary to the static trade-off theory. Comparing companies getting debt financing with those that issue external equity financing we find more evidence in favor of the debt capacity hypothesis. Both types of companies have high median debt ratios compared to companies using internal financing. However, the median internal cash flow to total asset ratio is significantly lower for companies issuing external equity compared to companies issuing debt financing, indicating that companies issuing external equity have lower debt capacity. Furthermore, it is striking that almost 20% of the companies getting external equity financing have a negative stockholders' equity in the previous year. Issuing additional debt financing may be almost impossible for these companies as the total amount of debt outstanding is larger than total assets.
Companies using external equity have a significantly higher risk of failure compared to firms using debt financing (and internal financing). Furthermore, the liquidation value of the companies attracting additional debt financing is higher compared to companies attracting external equity. These findings are consistent with hypothesis 3. Finally, companies getting external equity financing have a significantly higher ratio of intangible assets to total assets compared to companies using internal and debt financing. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 4. Table 5 presents the results of multinomial logit analyses with three possible outcomes: internal finance, financial debt and external equity financing. The units of analysis are the individual financing events. The multinomial logit analyses take into account that one particular company can have several financing events in one year.
Multivariate analyses
Panel A of table 5 reports the multinomial logit analysis with internal finance as the base outcome. The variables used as proxies to measure a company's preference for internal finance all have the expected negative sign. More profitable companies with a larger cash buffer prefer to finance investments internally. These results are consistent with hypothesis 1 and offer support for the pecking order theory.
Companies using internal financing have a higher debt capacity. Companies with higher cash flow, lower debt ratios and positive stockholders' equity are more likely to use internal financing. This finding is contrary to the predications of the static trade-off theory. One would expect companies with a lot of debt capacity to attract financial debt. This would allow profitable companies to benefit from the tax advantage of additional interest payments. We find evidence that profitable extreme growth companies with a lot of debt capacity, prefer to retain there debt capacity. Panel B of table 5 compares financial debt and external equity issuers. Although the debt ratio indicates that external equity issuers have a higher debt capacity, the cash flow ratio and negative stockholders' equity dummy indicate the opposite. The bivariate analyses, however, did indicate that although the median debt ratio is lower for companies issuing external equity compared to debt financing, it is still significantly higher compared to companies using internal financing. Taking into account that the median external equity issue is larger than the median debt issue, companies might have been unable to attract the same amount of debt financing as they did through the external equity issue. Therefore, our findings generally support hypothesis 2: growth companies with a lower debt capacity are more likely to attract additional external equity financing.
The analyses in table 5 are performed without the bankruptcy risk indicator as the correlation of this indicator with a company's profitability and debt ratio is high. Unreported analyses, however, confirm that companies with a high risk of failure are more likely to attract external equity financing. Furthermore, the results confirm the importance of asset structure. Companies with few tangible assets and therefore higher bankruptcy costs are more likely to search for equity financing. The analyses generally support hypothesis 3: growth companies with higher risk and costs of financial distress are more likely to search for external equity financing. Table 5 indicates that companies with more intangible assets, a proxy for growth options, are more likely to attract external equity financing compared to using internal financing or debt financing. This finding is consistent with hypothesis 4: growth companies with higher agency risk because of future growth options are more likely to attract external equity financing.
Finally, it is worth noting the coefficients of the previous debt and external equity financing dummies. Companies that previously issued external financing are more likely to de so in the future. Furthermore, companies issuing financial debt are more likely to do so in the future. While previous issuers of external equity are more likely to attract additional external equity in the future. These results may indicate the existence of a learning effect in the search for financing.
CONCLUSIONS
Financial capital is one of the key resources a company requires to support its growth. This paper researches financial decision making in a high growth setting. Although previous research indicates that financial management is of paramount importance, little is known about financial policy in a high growth setting. Using financial theory we provide testable hypotheses of financing behavior in an extreme growth setting. Our results are based on a longitudinal dataset of financing decisions made by extreme growth companies over an eight year period. Moreover, startups and companies disappearing from our database, because of company failure or mergers and acquisitions, are included. Therefore, our results do not suffer from survivorship bias.
Our results are consistent with the pecking order theory, taking into account debt constraints. More profitable companies prefer to finance investments internally. Companies using internal finance stockpile debt capacity. These companies do not attract debt financing, while the static trade off theory would suggest that exactly these companies should get additional debt financing in order to gain from debt tax shields. Companies issuing outside equity financing have significantly lower cash flow ratios. Companies issuing external equity may be unable to attract more debt financing as debt ratios are already high and cash flow could be insufficient to support additional debt-related payments. Furthermore, it is striking that stockholders' equity is negative in some 20% of the companies in the year previous to getting external equity. Finally, in line with the static trade-off theory, companies using debt financing have significantly lower expected costs of financial distress. Furthermore, when the probability of financial distress increases companies rely on external equity financing. Companies with more growth options, which are especially prone to agency costs, are more likely to attract additional external equity. Finally, we find indications of a learning effect in the search for external financing.
Our results are important for academics. As previously indicated high growth companies are multidimensional in nature. Further insight is needed into how different growth paths are related to financial management. Furthermore, we do not research whether access to financing causes growth or whether higher growth requires more financial capital. More research is needed to disentangle these two effects.
Our results are also important for management practice. By studying the financing behavior of extreme growth companies, entrepreneurs can gain a more thorough insight into financial policies related to extreme growth. Finally, our results are important for policymakers. Our research indicates the importance of internal finance in the financing of investment projects by extreme growth companies. Nevertheless, the Belgian tax regime (just like most foreign regimes), however, offers no incentive for businesses to retain earnings. Corporate tax is charged on retained profits, just as on profits distributed to shareholders. However, retained profits are an essential source of financing in a high growth setting. + where * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%. 0.0000 Pseudo R² 0.1291 * Industry and year dummies are included in the models, but are not reported. + Where * denotes significant at 10%, ** significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%.
